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Technocracy in Economic Policy-Making in Malaysia
Khadijah Md Khalid* and Mahani Zainal Abidin**
This article looks at the role of the technocracy in economic policy-making in Malay-
sia.  The analysis was conducted across two phases, namely the period before and 
after the 1997/98 economic and financial crises, and during the premiership of four 
prime ministers namely Tun Razak, Dr Mahathir, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, and 
Najib Razak.  It is claimed that the technocrats played an important role in helping 
the political leadership achieve their objectives.
The article traces the changing fortunes of the technocracy from the 1970s to 
the present.  Under the premiership of Tun Razak, technocrats played an important 
role in ensuring the success of his programs.  However, under Dr Mahathir, the 
technocrats sometimes took a back seat because their approach was not in line with 
some of his more visionary ventures and his unconventional approach particularly 
in managing the 1997/98 financial crisis.  Under the leadership of both Abdullah 
Ahmad Badawi and Najib Razak, the technocrats regain their previous position of 
prominence in policy-making.  In conclusion, the technocracy with their expert 
knowledge, have served as an important force in Malaysia.  Although their approach 
is based on economic rationality, their skills have been effectively negotiated with 
the demands of the political leadership, because of which Malaysia is able to maintain 
both economic growth and political stability.
Keywords: technocracy, the New Economic Policy (NEP), Tun Abdul Razak,  
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Introduction
Malaysia is a resource rich economy that had achieved high economic growth since early 
1970s until the outbreak of the Asian crisis in 1998.  However, growth has been moder-
ate in the post-Asian crisis period.  Malaysia began, in early 1960s, as an agriculture-based 
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economy but had embarked on an industrialization path when growth rates varied sub-
stantially due to fluctuating global primary commodity prices.  From 1970, Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) inflow and operations by multinational companies in electrical and 
electronic and textile industries producing for exports were the catalyst for Malaysian 
industrialization.  At the same time, Malaysia also experimented with import substitution 
industrialization by introducing heavy industries such as the national car, Proton.  As the 
economy matured, Malaysia entered another phase beginning in the mid-1990s where 
growth was to be based on knowledge and the services sector would play a larger role.
Malaysia is a small but very open economy; trade is twice the size of its Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP).  Its balance of payment has traditionally been characterized by 
surpluses in the merchandise account from a strong export performance but it has per-
sistent deficits in the services account.  In addition to hosting large FDI inflow, Malaysia 
also received short-term capital, which began arriving in large volumes in the early 1990s. 
This was a product of globalization and the policy of liberalizing the capital account, which 
later exposed the economy to new vulnerabilities.  During the period 1990–96, total net 
flows to Malaysia amounted to over 12% of GDP or USD8.6 billion, compared to 4.2% 
(USD1.5 billion) in the 1980s.
A noteworthy feature of the Malaysian development is that growth was achieved 
with equity.  The incidence of poverty was reduced drastically from 49.3% in 1970 to 
3.8% in 2009.  This performance was achieved based on stable and sound macro-economic 
fundamentals and policies.  Yet, at the micro-economic level, some distortions took place 
to accommodate sectoral group or racial interests.  Although, the policies were targeting 
high overall growth, selected sectors were promoted through, among others, direct  public 
sector intervention and the introduction of specific programs, which sometime were not 
consistent with market-based economic principles.
The analysis of Malaysia’s economic performance can be divided into three distinct phases:
(i) From Independence in 1957 to 1981
During the first part of this period (1957 to 1969), although laissez-faire economic policies 
were implemented, mild import substitution industrialization was also put in place in 
order to develop domestic industries.  This import substitution effort was only partially 
successful.  In the second part, from 1970, industrialization was promoted through the 
establishment of the export processing zone, which attracted many multinational com-
panies that formed the base for manufacturing exports.  Malaysia had taken full advantage 
of the relocation of FDI from the United States, Europe, and Japan seeking for investment 
location that offered lower labor costs.
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Although industrialization became a major economic contributor, the focus of 
 Malaysia’s economic development during this period was developing the rural economy. 
A lot of effort was undertaken to diversify the agriculture sector and upgrade the rural 
economy because these constituencies were the base for the ruling coalition party. 
Malaysia was a major exporter of rubber and tin but subsequently, with the diversification 
of agriculture, palm oil overtook rubber as the main agricultural export.  Large amount 
of funds were allocated for the rural sector for infrastructure development and activities 
to raise rural income.
Responding to the racial riot in 1969, the government launched the New Economic 
Policy (NEP) in 1970 with the twin objectives: poverty eradication irrespective of race 
and the restructuring of society to correct economic imbalances in order to reduce and 
eliminate the identification of race with economic functions.  The NEP is a major policy 
that shapes Malaysia’s socio-economic development because there were interventions 
made to ensure these objectives were met.  This policy has a major impact on technocracy 
in the public sector through the building of human capital and the dominance of one 
ethnic group—the Bumiputeras (sons of the soil)—in the public sector.
(ii) From 1981 until the outbreak of the Asian crisis in 1998
Dr Mahathir Mohamed became Malaysia’s fourth prime minister in 1981 and he embarked 
on a developmentalist state strategy that saw high state intervention and the expansion 
of the public sector’s role in the economy.  Many state-owned companies were estab-
lished, especially those which are entrusted to carry out the heavy industrialization policy. 
The economic crisis in 1985 due to large fiscal deficits and the collapse of primary com-
modity prices had triggered a fundamental policy change.  The size of the public sector 
was reduced and privatization was introduced to drive growth and efficiency.  This period 
also saw many liberalization and deregulation measures and the beginning of a closer 
cooperation between the public and private sectors.
As a result, the 1986–97 period is eulogized as Malaysia’s golden age; from 1990 to 
1996 the economy grew at an average annual rate of 8.5%, the longest period of sus-
tained high growth in Malaysian history.  Exports grew by double digits annually.  Malay-
sia reached full employment from 1993 to 1997, had low inflation and the public sector 
registered average fiscal surplus of about 2.4% of GDP annually (1993–97), which is a 
vast improvement from the 1985’s deficit of 0.6% of GDP.  Vision 2020 was launched in 
1991 with the aim of turning Malaysia into a developed country by the year 2020.  The 
attainment of this goal is predicated on the economy growing on average at an annual 
rate of 7% during the period 1990–2020 and therefore it is important for Malaysia to 
achieve long term macro-economic stability.  The private sector was given the task 
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to be the engine of growth while the public sector’s role is to facilitate private sector 
 activities.
(iii) 1998 onwards: the Post-Asian crisis period
The economic recession in 1998 was the worst in Malaysian history, with the GDP 
 contracting by 7.4%.  This crisis was triggered by regional contagion when the Thai baht 
depreciated massively.  However, internal difficulties such as excessive bank lending, 
and property bubbles had worsened the impact of the regional contagion and loss of 
investors’ confidence.  Malaysia introduced measures that were contrary to the con-
ventional wisdom; it introduced capital controls and pegged the exchange rate.  Malaysia 
recovered sharply in 2000, as with the other crisis hit economy, South Korea.  Dr 
 Mahathir took credit for these unconventional and controversial measures that worked.
During this post-crisis period, Malaysia’s growth has been moderated; GDP grew 
on average at about 5.0% during the 1999–2010 period as compared to 8.3% during the 
1986–97 period.  This performance is not unique to Malaysia because other regional 
countries also had the same sub-par growth.  Private investment, which fell significantly 
during the crisis, has not recovered.  To sustain growth, the public sector had to take a 
leading role by increasing its investment and expenditure, resulting in a persistent fiscal 
deficit.  On the other hand, exports, both manufacturing and primary commodities con-
tinue their high performance.  This performance has led to the rethinking of the Malay-
sian economic strategy to put the country back on a higher growth path and to improve 
its competitiveness and productivity.  The New Economic Model (NEM) for Malaysia 
was launched in 2010 with the goals of achieving a high income economy and inclusive 
and sustainable growth.
Role of Technocracy in Development
The role of technocrats has become increasingly more prominent in Malaysian develop-
ment since 1981.  Technocrats are an elite group with expert knowledge and ability that 
has continually served the governing elite (Miyakawa 2000, 11).  Technocrats are experts 
who formulate economic policy and implement it to achieve a set of targets, and are usu-
ally civil servants or professionals who receive special training in economics, business, 
or related field.
At the macro-level, Malaysia is an economic success story.  It has enjoyed high, 
steady GDP and per capita income growth with macro-economic stability.  It has become 
an important trading nation and a host to a large inflow of FDI.  In addition, social develop-
ment was not neglected—poverty had been significantly reduced and the wealth gained 
was relatively well distributed.  Does technocracy have a role in these achievements?
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Technocrats’ role in Malaysia’s economic policy-making and implementation has 
changed over these three periods.  Without doubt, technocrats were given the tasks to 
manage the economy at the macro-level so that the country could have an impressive 
economic growth.  But, at the same time, technocrats were side-stepped at the micro-
economic level.  Moreover, the changing role of technocrats depends largely on the 
balance of influence between technocracy and political leadership.
To understand the role of technocracy in economic development, it would be useful 
to examine the reasons why political leaders seek the assistance of technocrats, the 
background of the technocrats, and their relationship with politicians as well as their 
contributions.  As an open economy, technocrats are not needed in order for Malaysia to 
get international acceptance or assistance.  Instead their expertise and professionalism 
are likely to be used to ensure that development is properly done and the benefits of 
progress reach the people.
In the early stage of Malaysia’s development, the technocrats came from the civil 
services but in the later stages, businessmen and professionals had a larger role.  There 
were occasions when technocrats who were given key responsibilities turned to become 
politicians and be the leaders of other technocrats, many of whom were their former 
colleagues.  What is clear is that the role and contribution of technocrats are very much 
dependent on the personality and vision of the prime ministers.  This economic vision 
will also determine the type of technocracy needed.
In the Southeast Asian experience, macro-economic management was delegated to 
largely autonomous agencies and insulated technocrats, who pursued conservative poli-
cies.  In Indonesia, the so-called “Berkeley Mafia” (a group of economists sponsored by 
the US Government to receive their tertiary training in US economic faculties) was 
credited for steering the New Order’s economic policy and emphasizing macro-economic 
discipline (Neumann 2002).  The influence of technocracy on the country’s political 
leader ship was such that interests of specific groups were not able to override national 
interests.  Similarly, in Thailand the bureaucrats in the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and 
the Central Bank were allowed to pursue prudent policies.
Was the high economic growth in Malaysia as well as Thailand and Indonesia due 
to the economic technocrats being insulated from political pressures?  Is it true that a 
strong developmental state should ensure a high degree of autonomy enjoyed by decision-
makers, especially in the bureaucracy?  According to Booth (1998) “. . . in Thailand, 
Indonesia and Malaysia, technocrats in the ministries of finance have been able to insulate 
key areas of macroeconomic policy-making from overt political interference.”  Neumann 
(2002) is of the view that a hands-off approach in macro-economic management as well 
as insulating technocrats from political and business pressures had led to stability. 
K. Md Khalid and M. Zainal Abidin388
 However, inevitably, vertical patron-client network and political interests would lead to 
abuse of micro-economic policy for political advantage (ibid., 9).  Clearly, there is diver-
gence in effectiveness between macro-economic and micro-economic policies.
This inference raises the question of the role of technocracy in economic policy-
making when a country needs to achieve a relatively high rate of growth under increas-
ing challenges of globalization, a public sector that is supposed to take a facilitative role, 
a dynamic private sector to drive growth, and a democratic system where the interest of 
the public must be given due consideration.  These challenges faced by Malaysia in eco-
nomic policy-making became more acute in the period after the 1998 Asian financial 
crisis.  An important aspect to examine is whether the separation between economic 
imperatives and special interests can be done at both the macro- and micro-levels.  Thus, 
the analysis of the role of technocracy in economic policy-making cannot avoid examining 
the relationship between state and markets and how these two sides interact and influ-
ence one another and their effects on institutions and growth performance.  Emphasis 
will be given to the understanding of the dynamics of the relationship between techno-
crats and the political elite as well as the contribution of the former in the development 
of Malaysia after the Asian crisis.
The focus of this article is to study the role of technocracy in managing the Malay-
sian economy during and after the Asian crisis.  Economic technocracy should put 
 market and economic rationality at the forefront of economic policy to ensure that 
growth is well founded, resources are used efficiently, and the country is resilient and 
continues to be competitive.  The analysis will focus on two interrelated components—
issues and  players.  The issues are economic growth, sustainability, and competitiveness 
while the players are political leaders, institutions, and technocrats.  The conventional 
wisdom is that the market knows best and by extension technocrats can manage eco-
nomic matters efficiently to produce the desired outcomes.  “. . . The market claims that 
standard economic solutions as set out by the western capitalism ideals, in particular the 
neo-classic economics should be the right solution and this claim is presented by tech-
nocracy” (Shiraishi 2001).  By extension, institutional technocracy advocates “economic 
 rationality.”
This article will examine whether the “conventional wisdom” is applied or is appli-
cable to Malaysia, especially in the period after the Asian crisis (the post-crisis period). 
The discussion begins with a review of the role of technocracy from Malaysia’s inde-
pendence in 1957 until the Asian crisis in 1998.  This is followed by an analysis of the 
management of the crisis and the economy during the post-crisis period.  The post-crisis 
period is divided into three phases marked by the changing of the guards in Malaysian 
leadership.  Dr Mahathir Mohamed who steered Malaysia out of the Asian crisis stepped 
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down in October 2003 after 22 years as prime minister and he was succeeded by Dato’ 
Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi.  Dato’ Sri Najib Razak took over as prime minister in April 
2009, where he had to steer the economy through the global financial crisis which broke 
out in late 2008.  Undoubtedly, the analysis of economic policy-making and management 
in Malaysia in the post crisis period will no doubt be linked to the vision and style of the 
three leaders.
The Role of Technocracy in Malaysia’s Economic Development before  
the Asian Crisis
Although technocrats have always served the governing elite, “. . . however, technoc-
racy is not completely in consonance with the democratic governance of the general 
public, and as such there has always been tension between governing elite and the 
 general public throughout history” (Miyakawa 2000).  The tense relationship between 
rational governance and democracy is brought about by the fact that policy-making 
depends more and more on technocratic policy analysis and on bureaucratic organiza-
tions that have special expertise and relevant information.  Consequently, the democratic 
deliberation by the general public (in Malaysia’s case, the parliamentary deliberation) 
became less important.  Often, policies formulated by the technocracy and approved by 
the executive branch are passed through the Malaysian Parliament without sufficient 
deliberation.
Notwithstanding the role of the Parliament, in Malaysia, the more interesting rela-
tionship is between the technocracy and the ruling elite as symbolized by the Cabinet. 
In some periods, the Cabinet is represented by the Prime Minster and thus, the control 
of economic policy-making is largely dependent on the style and approach taken by the 
Prime Minister.
Technocracy in Malaysia is inherited from the British colonial system where the 
bureaucracy is set to be independent from the political process.  Besides the civil servants 
in the bureaucracy, from time to time, selected professionals from the business sector 
and academia are recruited to join the technocracy for specific tasks.  During the early 
period of Malaysia’s nationhood, the civil service attracted the best brains because it 
was considered an elite service and many were trained in Britain.  They were placed at 
key ministries and central agencies such as the MOF, the Bank Negara of Malaysia (the 
central bank), and the Economic Planning Unit (EPU).  In the later years, as the size of 
the civil service expanded, the recruitment was less stringent while most of them 
received their training in local higher educational institutions.  Nevertheless, the upper 
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echelon of the civil service continues to receive their post-graduate training overseas.
Technocrats’ influence is best seen in central agencies such as the central bank, the 
Treasury, the EPU, and Implementation Coordination Unit (ICU).  However, another 
important aspect of economic technocracy is the role played by government agencies in 
meeting specific development objectives.  These agencies are bodies under ministries 
that were established with special mandate to upgrade the rural areas and the economic 
status of the Bumiputeras.  Examples of such agencies are the Majlis Amanah Rakyat, 
Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) and Federal Land Consolidation and 
Rehabilitation Authority (FELCRA).
Generally, technocrats are considered to have made positive and influential contri-
bution to the socio-economic development of Malaysia.  The imperative of delicate race 
relations has to a large extent protected macro-economic policy-makers from parochial 
interference and hence allowed them to pursue long-term strategies without needing to 
focus solely on short-term outcomes.  The strategies and policies formed by these tech-
nocrats could have been influenced by their training in Western academic institutions as 
well as interaction with business leaders and world economic bodies such as the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
The discussion on the role of technocrats in Malaysian economic development 
 during the period before the Asian Crisis can be divided into two phases:
(i) From Independence in 1957 to 1981
Under the leadership of Tunku Abdul Rahman (the first prime minister), Tun Abdul Razak 
(the second), and Tun Hussein Onn (the third), technocrats experienced a relatively 
harmonious relationship with the political elite.  In fact, they were considered as valued 
partners and their views and advice were taken seriously.  Their contributions to eco-
nomic policy formulation and the implementation of these policies were enormous.  The 
technocrats were instrumental in designing many of the key economic policies such as 
the green revolution, export-oriented industrialization, national petroleum policy, and 
the development strategies embedded in the five-year plans.
This close relationship was not surprising, considering that both Tunku Abdul 
 Rahman and Tun Abdul Razak were members of the bureaucracy and many of the tech-
nocrats studied together with these leaders either at schools or universities.  The EPU 
was perceived to be the most influential institution because it decided on the allocation 
of development budget.  Senior EPU officers such as Thong Yaw Hong, G. K. Rama Iyer, 
and Radin Soenarno worked closely with the political leaders to implement the govern-
ment vision and plans.  The government agriculture policy, albeit conservative, has 
success fully diversified and modernized the sector with the creation of new land develop-
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ment schemes by the federal land authority.  These new land schemes, which were 
planted with palm oil, were used to mitigate the adverse effect of low and fluctuating 
rubber prices as well as solving the problem of landless farmers.
Tun Razak had paid a special focus on rural development and technocrats were 
critical in ensuring that his ideas were effectively implemented.  For example, Taib 
Andak, a close friend of Tun Razak was tasked to implement land redistribution scheme 
for the landless through FELDA.  When Taib retired, Raja Muhammad Alias Raja 
 Muhammad Ali, another technocrat was given the responsibility on FELDA to ensure 
that this important project was successful.  Likewise, technocrats in the Ministries of 
Finance and International Trade and Industries (MITI) as well as specialized agencies 
like the Malaysian Industrial Development Authority (MIDA) played a major role in 
designing incentives and industrial estates to attract FDI and to promote export-oriented 
industrialization.
Clearly, the technocrats had enjoyed a considerable leeway and influence in the 
formulation and implementation of macro-economic policies up to the early 1980s.  Politi-
cal leaders relied on technocrats not because the latter sought legitimacy or international 
acceptance but on the former’s ability and professionalism so that development would 
take place.  The technocrats were knowledgeable, professional, and skilful and were able 
to offer advice to politicians and were effective in implementation.  Delegation of macro-
economic policy formulation and implementation to insulated technocrats had enabled 
them to pursue conservative macro-economic policies.  During this period, technocrats 
were in the driving seats and some of the leading technocrats became national figures 
and household names.  For example, Ghazali Shafie, who was the Secretary General of 
the Ministry of Home Affairs and a very influential bureaucrat, joined the political elite 
by becoming the Minister of Home Affairs and thus brought the bureaucracy closer to 
the power apex.
Following the racial riot in 1969, the government declared a state of emergency, 
suspended the Parliament, and formed the National Operations Council (NOC).  This 
council was chaired by Tun Razak and he was assisted by the bureaucracy, Army, and 
Police.  During this time, the NEP was formulated by key technocrats, both Bumiputeras 
and non-Bumiputeras.
(ii) From 1981 until the outbreak of the Asian crisis in 1998
The changing balance of influence and role between technocrats and political leadership 
was evident when Dr Mahathir took office in 1981 as the nation’s fourth prime minister. 
He introduced measures to inculcate higher discipline in the bureaucracy and demanded 
greater productivity.  Dr Mahathir had strong visionary ideas on how to leap-frog the 
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economy to a higher level of development.  Some of Dr Mahathir’s ideas were modeled 
after the developmental experience of Japan and South Korea, namely state intervention 
to spur industrialization, which in turn would be the mainstay of the nation’s economic 
activities.
Heavy industrialization policy was introduced to drive the industrialization process. 
The public sector was used as a channel to realize these ideas and many government 
companies were established to implement the heavy industrialization policy such as the 
national car project.  As a consequence, the size of the public sector ballooned.  The 
technocrats’ role was to implement the strategies through the establishment of public 
enterprises and many were appointed to head these entities and the state-owned com-
panies.  Clearly, Dr Mahathir asserted a stronger role of the political elite over the 
“traditional” economic actors, namely the technocrats.
The 1985 economic recession had changed Dr Mahathir’s economic approach.  Lib-
eralization was seen as a way for Malaysia to attain higher growth.  The “new Mahathir 
leadership” became critical of the large bureaucracy and perhaps regarded it even as a 
hindrance to development.  Conversely, the private sector was given the responsibility 
to drive economic growth, resulting in the “rolling back” of the public sector by privatiz-
ing or closing inefficient public sector agencies and departments.  To provide the right 
environment for the private sector to take the lead role, the Government had introduced 
a number of liberalization measures such as in the banking sector, capital market, and 
relaxation of equity rules for FDI.
Dr Mahathir brought in Daim Zainuddin, a businessman-lawyer-politician and a close 
ally, into the government as his Finance Minister in order to implement his new economic 
approach of liberalization and privatization.  Daim supervised the creation of many private 
companies and nurtured a cadre of young Bumiputera entrepreneurs to ensure that the 
private sector become the main engine for growth.
The Malaysian Business Council was established in 1991 to bring the public sector 
and the business community closer.  Although the Malaysian Business Council served 
an important informational function, it had no authority to make decisions or provide 
direct input for policy-making.  During this period, a number of economic ideas, particu-
larly concerning privatization, came from the private sector while the technocrats were 
given the task of implementing these ideas only.  Dr Mahathir’s grand vision of making 
Malaysia a developed country—Vision 2020—was developed together with Dr Noordin 
Sopiee from the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), a think tank. 
Subsequently, the role played by technocrats took a back seat.
The increasing influence of the private sector and others from outside the bureau-
cracy did not mean that Dr Mahathir had totally sidelined the civil service.  He trusted 
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and relied heavily on a few key civil servants.  Azizan Zainul Abidin, his chief of staff, was 
entrusted with many important responsibilities and upon retirement from the civil service 
he was appointed to head Petronas, the national oil company.  Chief Secretaries to the 
government (head of the civil service) such as Sallehuddin Mohamed and Ahmad Sarji 
Abdul Hamid were close to and highly regarded by Dr Mahathir as they were tasked to 
ensure that the civil service implement policies efficiently.  Similarly, Raja Tun Mohar 
Raja Badiozaman, a key economic technocrat, was associated with a number of key 
 projects such as Proton, the national car and later became the economic adviser to Dr 
 Mahathir when he retired from the civil service.
It is clear that Dr Mahathir stamped his own idea on economic growth and along 
the way reduced the role of technocrats.  The fact that his tenure as prime minister 
covered 22 years meant that he had a longer institutional memory than the technocrats. 
As a result, he had a better understanding and grasp of the path of economic development 
that has been or should be taken.  His prime ministership also dispelled the idea that 
technocrats were guiding or advising the government—rather it was the technocrats who 
were the instruments of political rulers.  In effect, technocrats were an endogenous part 
of some deeper political processes.
Dr Mahathir’s economic vision was largely influenced by his desire to uplift  Malaysia’s 
economic status, for it to be a modern economy, have an economic strength and com-
petitive edge, enhance its role in the international trading system, have science and 
technological capability, and integrate well into a globalized economic system.  He believes 
that input and support from the business sector in economic strategies and growth are 
critical.
Dr Mahathir’s economic vision was premised on a strategy of high growth, which 
had also brought some macro-economic shortcomings, namely the formation of a savings-
investment gap, persistent current account deficits, and high private sector domestic 
debt.  Looking beyond the traditional indicators of economic fundamentals, there are 
also some signs of weaknesses such as the de facto peg exchange rate, asset price bub-
bles, and exposure to a large capital outflow.  At the micro-level, deficiencies were even 
more glaring—the high level of debts accumulated by some major companies, over-
reliance on the stock market for funding, asset price inflation, excess capacity in some 
sectors such as the construction industry, and the promotion of projects with question-
able viability.
Macro-economic indicators prior to the Asian crisis showed that the Malaysian 
economy was well managed.  It had a robust external sector, the public fiscal position 
was in surplus, the banking sector was well supervised and had sufficient capital, it was 
a receiver of foreign capital inflow (both short- and long-term ones), and its equity market 
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was the third largest in Asia.  In addition, it had full employment and inflation was low. 
These developments were achieved by market-based and private sector driven economic 
policies.  But when the crisis hit, the micro-level deficiencies outweigh the macro- 
economic fundamentals and pushed the economy downward, resulting in the strategies 
and policies being questioned and policy-makers scrutinized.
Management of the Asian Crisis
The impact of the 1997/98 economic and financial crisis was severe and it could destroy 
all the economic achievements that Malaysia had made over the past 40 years since its 
independence.  The most severe effect was on the financial sector—the ringgit exchange 
rate depreciated by 45% from its July 1997 level of RM2.50 to USD1; the equity market 
lost 80% of its market valuation; the short-term capital account showed a substantial net 
outflow of RM21.7 billion; and the interest rate level had jumped while the level of non-
performing loans (NPLs) of financial institutions had increased significantly.  The other 
severe impact was the massive contraction in the construction sector, sharp decline of 
domestic consumption and domestic private investment.  But the crisis also brought some 
positive effects, namely on exports where the initial exports reduction was reversed 
when the ringgit was pegged (at RM3.80 for one US dollar).  By virtue of depreciation, 
in nominal ringgit value of the total export, revenue had increased by 29.8%.  Fortunately, 
the price impact was limited with inflation capped at 5.3% and unemployment rate at 
3.2% (the unemployment effect was absorbed by foreign labor who returned to their home 
countries when the economy slowed down).
The impact and the causes of the crisis were the key factors in shaping Malaysia’s 
response to the crisis.  The crisis was triggered by external factors and worsened by 
internal weaknesses.  The contagion effects were set off by the baht devaluation in July 
1997, which caused the market and foreign investors to lose confidence in the health of 
the Malaysian and other regional economies.  The “voting by the feet” saw a massive 
outflow of short-term foreign capital, with the devastating effects of pushing down the 
value of the exchange rate.  The Malaysian domestic private sector which depended 
heavily on loans from the banking sector and the stock market had to brutally reduce 
their activities.  When interest rates increased and domestic consumption slowed down, 
the excess capacity especially in the construction industries had forced companies into 
heavy losses.  In sum, these weaknesses were mostly the product of liberalization efforts 
introduced earlier without the accompanying safeguard measures.
As with the other affected countries, Malaysia’s early response was to adopt the 
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standard IMF-style measures,1) namely tightened fiscal and monetary policies, introduce 
measures to redress balance of payment deficits and float the exchange rate.  The govern-
ment had also deferred mega projects and initiated cutbacks on government purchase of 
foreign goods.  In the financial sector, a comprehensive set of measures was implemented 
such as reclassifying the NPLs in arrears from six to three months and greater financial 
disclosure by financial institutions.  A credit plan was also introduced to limit overall 
credit growth to 25% by end-1997 and 15% by end-1998, where priority was given to 
productive and export-oriented activities.  The central bank had also raised the three-
month intervention rate from 10% to 11%, increased the minimum risk-weighted capital 
adequacy ratio from 8% to 10%, and reduced the single customer limit from 30% to 25%. 
The level of provisions against uncollateralized loans was also increased to 20%.
However, these initial policies as advocated by the “Washington Consensus”2) did 
not produce the expected results.  The fiscal reduction of 20% and infrastructure projects 
deferment had severely contracted domestic demand.  In addition, higher interest rate 
and credit tightening had starved domestic firms of funds at a reasonable cost.  As a result, 
the domestic economy continued to deteriorate and the exchange rate remained volatile. 
The private sector was in serious trouble and it could not lead the recovery as it did in 
the 1985 crisis.  Moreover, the private sector’s rising debts could threaten the stability 
of banking institutions due to the inadequacy of capital to meet the rising NPLs.  The 
external environment was very volatile and uncertain and recovery from the crisis would 
need much more than an export-driven recovery strategy.  In other words, the standard 
solution as suggested by the IMF was not working.
The ferocity and speed of the unfolding events of the crisis required a different and 
radical approach.  If the situation continued to worsen, the crisis could have destroyed 
Malaysia’s economic achievements.  Therefore, a co-ordinated, comprehensive, and cen-
tralized approach was adopted.  This was a departure from the 1985 crisis management, 
which was primarily the responsibility of the MOF.  In 1985, the globalization was not as 
extensive and the domestic economy was less integrated with the regional and global 
economies as in the 1990s.  As such, the government had the time to prepare for any 
transmission of shocks as capital flows was also less volatile then.  Unlike in 1998 when 
1) IMF argues that the crises in Southeast Asian countries were not the result of macro-economic 
mismanagement but their weak institutions e.g. cronyism in government-business relationship, 
overly geared and overly concentrated corporations, and weak financial systems.  The solutions 
demanded measures that went beyond the usual demand for liberalization and privatization but 
required programs to transform institutions to unprecedented extent.
2) The “Washington Consensus” list of desirable policies included stable fiscal and monetary policies; 
low inflation; exploitation of comparative advantage through trade, exchange rate, and foreign invest-
ment policies; flexible labor market; and market-friendly—if not exactly laissez-faire—governments.
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the public sector position was a surplus, Malaysia experienced twin deficits in the fiscal 
and external payment positions in 1985.  Hence, the fiscal policy stance adopted by the 
MOF then was different with the focus mainly on fiscal restraint through a privatization 
exercise as government downsized its role in the economy.
In 1998 it was the private sector that was the weak link in the economic chain and 
this posed a greater problem—if the private sector were to succumb to the crisis, and 
then it would bring down the banking sector in its wake.  Fortunately, the public sector 
was in a stronger position (having a smaller share of outstanding external debt at 11.4% 
in 1998 as compared to 53.6% in 1985) and so was able to effectively lead in the recovery 
process.  Indeed it was very clear that a hands-on crisis management style of keeping a 
constant watch on the economy, sometimes down to the micro-level, was needed because 
of the potentially dire consequences brought upon by the unprecedented speed of crisis.
When the crisis first broke in July 1997, Dr Mahathir was preparing for his retire-
ment and the management of the economy was left largely to Anwar Ibrahim, the Deputy 
Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance.  Dr Mahathir was alarmed and unhappy 
when the early crisis response measures, which followed the standard prescription of 
cutback in public sector expenditure and higher interest rate, did not produce the desired 
outcome but instead made the economy worse.  Dr Mahathir decided that the response 
to the crisis must be comprehensive and quick, address the critical issues, and serve 
the needs and interest of the nation.  More importantly, since the standard economic 
 remedies were not working, new measures must be introduced.  For quick and effective 
implementation, a new body must be created that can overcome the issues of overlapping 
ministerial jurisdiction.  The National Economic Action Council (NEAC) was established 
in early 1998 for this purpose.
The priorities set by the NEAC were:
• The domestic economy to lead the recovery process
In view of the external volatility and uncertainty, expansion of the domestic econ-
omy was essential to compensate for the adverse impact of contracting externally 
linked economic activities.
• Stabilization of the ringgit
With a stable ringgit, domestic production could resume because exchange rate 
uncertainty would have been removed.  Most businesses could operate at any 
exchange rate level, after making adjustments, as long as there was some degree 
of stability.
• Regaining monetary policy independence
Malaysia must regain the control of its monetary policy and this could be done 
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only if the link between interest and exchange rates was severed.  Monetary 
independence would allow a substantial reduction of the interest rate without 
putting pressure on the currency.
• Restoring market confidence
Malaysia had a reputation as a good investment location and the crisis was, in part, 
attributed to the loss of confidence among international investors.  The loss of 
domestic confidence followed when the economy deteriorated and the exchange 
rate plunged.  The restoration of market confidence, particularly domestic, was 
crucial to bringing back a favorable environment for investment.
• Maintaining financial market stability
Financial institutions without adequate capital to meet this contingency would not 
be able to perform their intermediary functions of funding business activities and 
this could throttle the economy.
• Ensuring adequate liquidity to finance economic activities
For the economy to stabilize and grow, there must be sufficient liquidity and a 
reasonable level of interest rate, which will allow companies to borrow again and 
resume their activities.
• Preserving socio-economic stability
In an ethnically diverse society, socio-economic considerations are vital for con-
tinued stability and harmony.  Experience has shown that economic hardship could 
feed racial tension, if one ethnic group perceived that it was suffering more than 
other groups or if one group was less distressed.  The recovery measures must 
ensure that policies were not only economically efficient and market consistent 
but also supported socio-economic and strategic objectives.
• Assisting affected sectors
Some sectors were more affected than others during the crisis, and since some of 
them are critical to the economy, steps must be taken to maintain their viability.
Before the formation of the NEAC, management of the economy was primarily in 
the hands of the Treasury which is, part of the MOF.  But the Treasury did not have 
jurisdiction over other parts of the government structure that are also essential in deal-
ing with the crisis.  The government needed a national committee (NEAC) that brought 
together all the relevant ministries and interest groups to overcome the problem of 
inter-agency areas of responsibility.  This would eventually allow a more focused and 
integrated strategy, applied consistently to all ministries.  NEAC would also consolidate 
the national institutional capacity in implementing measures and to ensure a quick 
response to any new challenges triggered by the crisis.
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The need for impartiality of the crisis management team decisions was paramount. 
It must look beyond a particular inclination or stance of any ministry or central public 
agency.  In the early stage of the crisis, the MOF, including Bank Negara Malaysia, 
favored the adoption of IMF-style solutions.  But others, particularly Dr Mahathir, had 
argued for possible counter measures, namely an easier interest rate and expansionary 
fiscal policies.  This policy dichotomy was not a good platform from which to develop a 
crisis response.  The often cited example of the policy differences between Dr Mahathir 
and the MOF was the forced resignations of the Governor and Deputy Governor of Bank 
Negara Malaysia when these officials disagreed with Dr Mahathir’s suggestion that inter-
est rate should not be increased but instead should be lowered.3)  Some commentators 
interpreted these resignations as part of the political feud between Dr Mahathir and 
Anwar Ibrahim, leading up to the sacking of the latter on September 2, 1998 (Khoo 2003).
Ideally of course, Malaysia would be best served by policies flowing from all minis-
tries and public agencies, which also reflected the general sentiment.  Such neutrality 
would ensure that whatever policies adopted were not perceived by the public and media, 
as coming solely from one influential group.  Also conflicting and over-lapping jurisdiction 
of ministries and public agencies could vitiate the full implementation of crisis.  Unfortu-
nately with the division in views becoming more and more evident, the opportunity to 
develop consensus was diminishing.  Another policy vehicle was needed, one that had 
credibility and broad bipartisan support.  To overcome this, the NEAC therefore had to 
be a high-level council with a strong executive implementation mandate.
By virtue of its diverse membership and powerful leadership, the NEAC was well 
positioned to integrate the diverse functions and jurisdiction of the many ministries and 
government agencies.  This later proved to be a key factor in solving the many and com-
plex problems that were to come the NEAC’s way.  These two strengths—an integrated 
policy response and overcoming institutional rigidity—came from having the Prime 
 Minister as the chairman of the NEAC.  The NEAC members included the private sectors 
and professionals from outside the bureaucracy.  In fact, the Executive Director of NEAC 
at that time was Daim Zainuddin, a former Finance Minister, businessman, and confidante 
of Dr Mahathir and some view this as a move to marginalize Anwar Ibrahim.  The other 
members of the NEAC were Anwar Ibrahim (Deputy Chairman), Daim Zainuddin, Dr 
Noordin Sopiee (Chairman of ISIS), and Oh Siew Nam (businessman).  The work of the 
NEAC was supported by the EPU as the Secretariat and the NEAC Working Group.  The 
NEAC Working Group worked directly for the Executive Director to produce the National 
3) It is unclear whether the Deputy Governor, Fong Weng Pak, was forced to resign or his contract 
had ended.
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Economic Recovery Plan which proposed the response measures to be taken.  Members 
of the Working Group came from the private sector, a think tank, and academia.4)
NEAC was established as a consultative body to the Cabinet, and many parties 
questioned its effectiveness without an implementation mandate.  Moreover, at that time 
the Treasury was in charge of most economic and financial decisions and so few could 
imagine that the NEAC was going to lead the crisis management process.  However, the 
NEAC needed a mandate and clout to implement its decisions, something that it would 
not be able to do should it be just another consultative body.  It was decided while the 
executive powers would remain with the Cabinet and the NEAC be its consultative body 
on economic matters, the latter should be conferred some executive powers.  The control 
structure of NEAC requires that every important decision made by the Council has to be 
approved or endorsed by the Cabinet, although sometimes there was a time lag when 
some of the measures had to be implemented immediately.  In addition, the Parliament 
must also approve any major policies or institutional changes.  During the course of 
NEAC’s operations, however, it became very influential, primarily because the mandate 
was derived from its chairman, the Prime Minister.
The Malaysian response was certainly unconventional and not based on the standard 
economic reasoning as advocated by the technocrats.  Capital controls were clearly 
against the economic conventional wisdom and normally introduced by countries to solve 
non-economic problems.  The solutions, which could be interpreted as isolating or insu-
lating the country against external vagaries, were also not usually taken by a small open 
economy which is dependent on the world for its well-being.  Although Dr Mahathir was 
an early supporter of globalization, his criticism on the harmful side of globalization as 
exhibited by the Asian crisis is consistent with the Malaysian response to the crisis and 
could be linked with Malaysia’s stance on a more cautious path to liberalization.  For 
example, Malaysia refused to allow foreign investors to buy distressed domestic assets 
even though this approach was adopted by the other crisis hit countries in the region.
The measures taken which were considered, at that time, to go against the conven-
tional wisdom are:
• Reversing budget surplus into deficit through fiscal stimulus programs
The budget stance was reversed from a surplus of 3.2% of the GNP in 1998 to a 
deficit of 6% in 1999.
4) Members of the NEAC Working Group were Wan Azmi Wan Hamzah (businessman), Thong Yaw 
Hong (former senior bureaucrat/banker), Dr Zainal Aznam Yusof (researcher), and Dr Mahani Zainal 
Abidin (academician).
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• Easing the monetary stance
The statutory reserve requirement for banks was gradually reduced from 13.5% 
in February 1998 to 4% in September 1998.  The base lending rate (BLR) was 
reduced from a high of 12.3% in June 1998 to 6.79% in October 1999.
• Stabilization of the ringgit
Introduced capital controls measures on September 1, 1998.  The selective capi-
tal controls have two inter-related parts: first, the pegging of the ringgit to the US 
dollar at a rate of RM3.80 to USD1 and second, the restriction on the outflow of 
short-term capital.
But at the same time, the political leadership also paid heed to the economic tech-
nocracy and introduced market-based measures to address some of the causes of the 
crisis.  These measures, which were based on industry best practice, were targeted to 
ensure that the banking sector remained sound.  For this purpose an asset management 
company (Danaharta) was set up to manage NPLs of financial institutions.  Then, a 
 Special Purpose Vehicle (Danamodal) was set up to capitalize the banking sector and the 
Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee (CDRC) was set up to facilitate debt restruc-
turing of viable companies.
An array of measures was also introduced to further strengthen the governance 
environment including improving transparency and disclosure standards; establishing a 
committee on corporate governance; enhancing monitoring and surveillance; enhancing 
accountability of company’s directors; protecting the rights of minority shareholders; and 
reviewing codes and acts to minimize weaknesses.
The economic governance process during the crisis, particularly in the key years of 
1997 and 1998, was the product of an extremely dynamic situation.  The Malaysian 
economy was, in the 1990s, already very much integrated with the global one, and many 
of its crisis parameters were external.  Thus, any policy decisions must bear in mind the 
openness of the economy.  The question of whether the policies were reactive or pro-
active was also critical—in crisis times, while the reactive process dominated policy 
decisions, the government must also be pro-active for policies to be effective and efficient.
Dr Mahathir was frustrated with the approach proposed by the bureaucracy, which 
had followed the standard crisis solutions.  He wanted a new approach, a “thinking outside 
the box,” particularly in dealing with the sharply depreciating currency.  Nor Mohamed 
Yakcop, a former senior official of the Bank Negara Malaysia explained to him the work-
ings of speculation on currency and this confirmed to Dr Mahathir that the ringgit had 
to be pegged if the economy was to be saved.  Other ideas on the formation of special 
vehicles to deal with NPLs and to recapitalize the financial institutions came from  models 
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that have been successfully implemented in other countries.
In managing this crisis, Dr Mahathir employed a new set of technocrats from 
amongst the retired civil servants, businessmen, professionals, researchers, and acade-
micians.  The civil service was used primarily for implementing the measures suggested 
by this new set of technocrats.  Dr Mahathir took this route because he disagreed with 
the earlier crisis response measures implemented by the bureaucracy and wanted new 
solutions, even though they were deemed controversial.  However, another explanation 
is that Dr Mahathir wanted to wrest control of the economy from Anwar Ibrahim and 
thus, he had to establish a new economic team.  Notwithstanding the political struggle 
between the two leaders, the civil service implemented the measures proposed by the 
NEAC effectively, particularly the capital controls and the pegging of the ringgit, which 
were crucial for Malaysia in overcoming the crisis.
The Role of Technocracy during the Post-Crisis Period
Dr Mahathir felt vindicated because although initially the world had denounced  Malaysia’s 
response to the crisis, the measures had worked.  Malaysia recovered relatively well with 
less economic and social costs as compared with some other crisis-hit countries.  Even 
the IMF, in time, acknowledged that capital controls could be alternative solutions to a 
crisis.  After recovery from the crisis, Malaysia as many other countries in the region 
and world faced a number of economic shocks namely the September 11 incidence, SARS 
epidemic, and the Middle East conflicts.  Dr Mahathir, through NEAC, continued the 
Asian crisis policy response by keeping an accommodative monetary policy and expand-
ing the fiscal stimulus programs.  By then, the world had taken note of the earlier Asian 
crisis experience and response and most countries followed that approach in dealing with 
these shocks.
It is worthwhile to note that even though Dr Mahathir had introduced response 
measures that were contrary to the conventional wisdom, Malaysia had followed the 
standard solutions in other areas particularly in terms of enhancing corporate governance 
and in dealing with the financial sector’s problems.  Dr Mahathir continued the mecha-
nism of economic management even when the economy had recovered from the crisis. 
Yet, there were also criticisms that Malaysia had refused to “bite the bullet” namely to 
allow problem companies to fail and for deep restructuring to take place.  One thing is 
clear—the public sector is back in the driving seat for driving economic recovery and 
growth when the private is unable to do so.
The Asian crisis has redefined the new economic priorities for Malaysia, as follows:
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• To achieve a sustained high growth path
The 1997–98 turmoil highlighted the pitfall of a growth strategy based on accu-
mulation of inputs, in this case high capital investment.  Therefore, Malaysia’s 
economic goals—to be an industrialized nation and to restructure its society—
must now be based on productivity, technology, and knowledge.  The government 
had announced new policy initiatives to produce high growth, namely:
i. Knowledge-based economy: This strategy is to respond to the changing nature 
of the global economic activity driven by rapid advancements in information 
and communication technologies.  A key ingredient for a successful knowledge-
based economy is the availability of the right human capital, which requires a 
sufficient pool of educated, flexible, well-trained, and highly skilled manpower.
ii. Human capital: This vision of the future economic and competitive landscape 
naturally requires a high quality human capital.  Malaysia’s education sector 
has to make a quantum leap to build a labor force that is not only proficient in 
employing today’s technology but also able to contribute to and shape the 
technology and ideas of tomorrow.
• New sources of growth: The next growth cycle would have to come from the 
services sector.  To achieve this target, service sector’s productivity must be 
improved.
• Revisiting the privatization policy: A review is useful to ensure that balance 
between efficiency and benefit of privatization is maximized.
• Deepening the capital market: One of the main reasons for the 1997–98 crisis was 
the over-dependence of companies on the banking sector and the equity market 
in raising funds to finance their activities.  The third source of capital, that is the 
bond market, should be developed further to reduce the reliance on the two other 
sources and to better match funding risks and returns.
• Increasing economic competitiveness:
i. Malaysia can no longer compete on cost alone: The sales pitch must point to 
world class quality and service.  A key consideration is for Malaysia to reposi-
tion itself in the global supply chain by becoming a base for R&D, production 
of critical components and design and procurement centers.
ii. Continue with plans to liberalize selected sectors: The financial sector con-
solidation plan has merged 58 financial institutions into 10 banking groups. 
This exercise is part preparation for liberalization where ultimately domestic 
financial institutions will have to compete freely with larger and more efficient 
foreign financial institutions.
• Restructuring of the corporate sector: More professional managers are needed. 
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The question that was put forward in the aftermath of the crisis was whether there 
is a need to remake Malaysia Inc.  because of over-reliance on a number of owner-
entrepreneurs has not produced a robust corporate Malaysia.  While this model 
benefits from their risk-taking dynamism, there is concern that this trait would 
lead to insufficient emphasis on controls, good governance, and risk management 
and asset-liability management.
• Continuing with the objectives of restructuring the society to achieve a more 
balanced socio-economic composition: Although the NEP has reduced poverty, it 
has not been very successful in its task of raising the Bumiputeras corporate equity 
to the targeted 30% share.  The issue of the restructuring of society has now an 
added dimension: while the numerical targets are still important and are being 
pursued, of equal importance is the question of quality of these achievements.
When Abdullah Ahmad Badawi took over as Prime Minister in November 2003, 
naturally there were questions about the new prime minister’s approach towards eco-
nomic strategy and policy formulation.  Highest in the mind of the public and the invest-
ing community is whether Abdullah Badawi would maintain the existing economic strat-
egies and economic policy-making structure.
Although Dr Mahathir had set out many policies for Malaysia, it is not unexpected 
that Abdullah Badawi would introduce his own strategy for Malaysia’s economic growth 
as well as the players who would influence economic policy.  It is worthwhile to note that 
Abdullah Badawi came from the civil service—he held a high ranking position in the 
bureaucracy before joining politics.5)  Therefore, his preference towards restoring the 
role of technocrats was understandable.  Even though there were calls for the private 
sector to resume their role as the driver for economic growth, there were little concrete 
measures to back this call.  The government continued to stimulate growth through its 
investment and thus unable to reduce the fiscal deficits.
Abdullah Badawi’s economic strategy was to focus on soft infrastructure (enhancing 
human capital and knowledge).  Among his major policies were:
• Setting targets forwards achieving a balanced budget
• Continuing the liberalization efforts in order to attract foreign investment inflows, 
particularly portfolio investment
5) Abdullah Ahmad Badawi was the Principal Assistant Secretary of the National Operations Council 
(NOC)/MAGERAN (Majlis Gerakan Negara), the Director of Youth at the Ministry of Culture, Youth 
and Sports after that, and later on the Deputy Director-General of the same ministry.
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• Allowing more competition in the automotive industry, which may ultimately 
reduced the dominance of the national cars
• Deferment of mega projects
• Removal of oil subsidy
• Making the agriculture industry as another engine for growth
• Focus on biotechnology
This focus on soft infrastructure was in contrast to Dr Mahathir’s preference for 
hard infrastructure (highways, airports, hospitals, and schools) and some groups had 
interpreted this as reversing earlier policies.
The conservative and cautious approach of technocrats in the MOF and Bank  Negara 
Malaysia was obvious in the Government’s response to key contemporary economic 
issues.  For example, the Government was largely silent on the calls to review the  ringgit 
peg including from Dr Mahathir, the architect of the scheme, and the ringgit peg was 
only removed when China did so in July 2005.  Similarly, there is no immediate and 
comprehensive response to the steeper than usual increases in the Consumer Price Index 
in 2005, as a result of higher oil price.
Abdullah Badawi’s new style of governance is characterized by inclusiveness, which 
was supposed to be different from Dr Mahathir’s.  He urged the people to “work with 
me, and not for me” and presented a style of leadership that invited greater participation, 
offered accommodation, and built consensus.6)  His people-friendly measures were com-
prehensive and systematic and extended beyond the public service delivery system to 
the general public and the private sector.  A high-powered taskforce called PEMUDAH 
was established to reduce bureaucratic red-tape and facilitate the public-private sector 
partnership and to support the transformation of the public service from a regulator to 
an enabler.  As part of his program to increase professionalism in the government, 
 Abdullah Badawi appointed non-politicians—Nor Mohamed Yakcop, who was Dr 
 Mahathir’s economic adviser and Amirsham Aziz, a former banker—in his Cabinet.
The expectation that the bureaucracy’s role, which was marginalized and side-lined 
in key decision-making process in the previous administration would be restored did not 
fully materialize.  It is true that technocracy played a more important role in formulating 
and steering the economic direction in Abdullah Badawi’s Administration, however, the 
players were not from the public service but from different groups.  Unlike Dr Mahathir, 
who sourced economic and business ideas directly from top business leaders, Abdullah 
Badawi sought counsel from professionals in the private sector.
6) (Sivamurugan et al. 2010).
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This inability of the civil service to resume a lead role in public administration and 
in giving advice to the political leaders to meet the more sophisticated and complex 
demands of the nation’s socio-economic development could be partly due to the structure 
of the public sector that is heavily dominated by the Malays.  In 2010, 77% of the 900,000 
civil service was made up of Malays, 9.4% Chinese, 5.1% Indians, and the balance by 
other Bumiputeras.7)  This structure does not reflect the country’s demographic compo-
sition of 67.4% Bumiputeras (including Malays), 24.6% Chinese, 7.3% Indians, and 0.7% 
others.  The NEP had favored a higher employment of Malays in the public sector to 
compensate for the lower ratio of Malays employed in the private sector.  In the 1970s 
and 1980s, there was a higher proportion of non-Malays in the important ministries and 
in critical posts as compared to now.  Some observers concluded that this preference for 
employing Malays has undermined the practice of meritocracy in the recruitment and 
promotion in the civil service.  Low salary is also a factor that discourages the Chinese 
from joining the civil service.
Another important departure from the Mahathir era was the appointment of young 
business professionals in key public sector agencies such as Khazanah Nasional (the 
investment arm of the government), Tenaga Nasional (the privatized national energy 
company), and Telekom Malaysia (the privatized national telecommunication company). 
These technocrats were tasked to transform Khazanah Nasional and government-linked 
companies (GLCs) to be the new national economic pace setter and create dynamic and 
efficient companies that would drive the national economic growth.  The Government-
Linked Company Transformation Program was launched in 2004 and these GLCs were 
given performance targets.  They had performed well and were a dominant force in the 
economy: during the 2004–12 period, the GLCs gave a 14.5% per annum total shareholder 
return, increased their market capitalization by USD65.3 billion, and delivered 18.2% per 
annum earnings growth.  As well as having a dominant presence in some domestic indus-
tries, some of these GLCs have successfully ventured abroad, particularly in financial 
and telecommunication sectors in ASEAN.
 Khazanah Nasional and GLCs were the new technocracy, where professionals with 
private sector experience brought new approaches to public sector governance and 
 policy formulation.  Many of these technocrats were trained in business schools or 
served in management consultancy.  This elite group included Azman Mokhtar (head of 
Khazanah Nasional), Wahid Omar (Telekom Malaysia and later Maybank),8) and Che 
7) Public Service Commission Annual Report 2010 (Government of Malaysia 2010).
8) Wahid Omar is now Minister at the Prime Minister’s Department.  He was appointed Senator, and 
later Minister, after the 13th General Election in May 2013.
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Khalib Mohamed Nor (Tenaga Nasional).  The injection of these new technocrats, who 
are qualified Bumiputeras (many were graduates from top tier world universities and 
have worked internationally) is also to overcome the lack of technical competency in the 
civil service.  Thus, although the NEP remains the underlying policy, the new Bumiputera 
technocrats are highly skilled, competitive and have international experience.  They also 
work together and are supported by non-Bumiputera technocrats in Khazanah Nasional 
and many of the GLCs.  For example, there are four non-Bumiputera Executive Directors 
working with four other Bumiputera Executive Directors in the key investments port-
folio.  Likewise, CIMB Bank, a GLC that was formed through the amalgamation of vari-
ous banks including the Bank Bumiputera,9) and now one of the top two banks in Malay-
sia and has a significant ASEAN footprint, has non-Bumiputeras in its top management 
team such as Deputy Chief Executive Officer (CEO) in charge of corporate banking, 
Deputy CEO in charge of consumer banking and chief financial officer.
These private sector but government-linked technocrats had the stamp of prime 
ministerial authority to promote efficiency, effectiveness, and professionalism in the 
government machinery.  This increasing “privatization” of the technocracy (as distin-
guished from the bureaucracy as a whole) has blurred the lines between a true technocrat 
and a “corporate-technocrat.”  They also increasingly functioned as “mediators” between 
the Cabinet and the ministries.  This is discerned most clearly in the measuring of the 
performance of ministries under the Ministry Key Result Areas (MKRAs) which was 
later introduced by the Najib Razak’s administration.  It is interesting to note that although 
Dr Mahathir himself never went that far in the “privatization” of the bureaucracy with 
the appointment of “outsiders” into technocratic roles and positions, it conformed to his 
agenda of continuously modernizing the public service.  The increasing role and influence 
of the GLCs strengthens the conceptual framework that the public and private sectors 
are partners and must develop synergistic relationship.
Clearly in the Abdullah Badawi Administration, technocrats were given a more 
prominent role but unlike the 1970s and early 1980s, and the control of economic policy-
making was with the new technocrats—young professionals with corporate experience—
from the GLCs.  Another important development was that Abdullah Badawi allowed the 
Parliament a closer scrutiny of the government economic policies and measures.
9) Bank Bumiputera Malaysia Berhad (BBMB) was established in 1965 in line with government initia-
tives to increase Bumiputera participation in the national economy.  By 1980 it had become the 
largest bank in the country in terms of assets with overseas operations.  In 1999, BBMB and Bank 
of Commerce merged to form Bumiputera-Commerce Bank.  In 2006 CIMB completed its restruc-
turing exercise under Bumiputera-Commerce Holdings Berhad with mergers and acquisitions of a 
number of banks and financial institutions to become a universal bank, known as the CIMB Group.
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The euphoria and “feel-good” sentiments which initially accompanied the results of 
the 2004 general election, where Abdullah Badawi and Barisan Nasional (the ruling coali-
tion) won the largest mandate, later gave way to cynicism, sense of betrayal, and growing 
disenchantment.  Rising costs of living, rising crime, and the continuance of a corrupt 
culture were some of the main factors contributing to an increasingly negative perception 
of Abdullah Badawi—broken promises, unfulfilled pledges, and shattered expectations.
The 2008 general election gave the Barisan Nasional its worst election result, where 
it lost for the first time its two-thirds parliamentary majority and five states plus the 
Federal Territory to the opposition coalition.10)  Besides the perception of unfulfilled 
expectations and promises, it was argued that the massive election loss was attributed 
to the role played by and influence of the “Fourth Floor Boys,” Abdullah Badawi’s young 
advisers led by his son-in-law, which was touted as the “real power behind the throne.”
With such election results, it was untenable for Abdullah Badawi to continue as 
Prime Minister.  However, Najib Razak only assumed the premiership in April 2009, 12 
months after the 2008 general election.  The global economy, which had just entered its 
worst crisis since the Great Depression in late 2008 was not a welcoming curtain raiser 
for the new prime minister.  Although the Malaysian financial sector was not affected, 
the impact of the global crisis came through the real sector, where the sizeable drop in 
exports had threatened to push the economy into a recession.
Najib Razak had once described himself as a “technocratic politician” in an interview 
with the Malaysian Business Magazine (1993).  This was based on his early experience 
as an executive with Petronas from 1974–76.  He also served briefly with Bank Negara. 
Trained as an economist and with Malaysia’s experience in dealing with the 1998 Asian 
Crisis, Najib Razak firmly responded by launching a large fiscal stimulus package, with a 
size of about 10% of the gross domestic product and lowering of interest rates.  Part of 
the stimulus package was spent on skills training and infrastructure development.  These 
measures were the new standard prescription for responding to a crisis where the  market 
demand collapsed.  In such cases, the public sector had to stimulate the economy through 
fiscal surplus and accommodative monetary policy.  These new standard prescription was 
implemented well by the bureaucracy and the Malaysian economy recovered well in 2010 
after declining by 1.7% in 2009.
Since the Asian crisis, the Malaysian economy was only growing at a moderate rate 
and it was stuck in the “middle income trap.”  After attaining a middle income country 
10) The five states which were lost to the Opposition coalition were Selangor, Penang, Perak, Kedah, 
and Kelantan.  However, 10 months later, Perak was brought back to the Barisan Nasional (BN) 
fold when three members of the Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) Opposition coalition declared them-
selves as BN-friendly independents.
K. Md Khalid and M. Zainal Abidin408
status in the early 1990s, Malaysia was unable to progress well to join the group of high 
income countries.  Najib Razak saw it as his mission to uplift the status of the Malaysian 
economy through a new economic model.  For this purpose, he established the NEAC in 
June 2009.  The Chairman of the Council was Amirsham Aziz, the former minister in 
charge of the EPU in the Abdullah Badawi Administration.  Two members of the NEAC 
Working Group under Dr Mahathir (the body that was charged with the formulation and 
implementing the recovery measures during the Asian crisis, and hence warranting the 
word “Action” in its name), Dr Zainal Aznam Yusof and Dr Mahani Zainal Abidin were 
brought back into service.  Other members of the Council are Andrew Sheng (former 
Chairman of the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission), Dzulkifli Abdul Razak 
(Vice-Chancellor, Universiti Sains Malaysia), Dr Hamzah Kassim (technology and  public 
policy consultant), Dr Yukon Huang (World Bank), Dr Homi Kharas (Brookings Insti-
tution), Prof. Danny Quah (London School of Economics), and Nicholas S. Zefferys (busi-
nessman).
Najib Razak also launched the NKEA to complete his economic transformation pro-
gram.  This work has been tasked to Idris Jala, the former Chief Executive Officer of 
Malaysian Airlines and now appointed a Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department 
and the head of PEMANDU (Performance Management and Delivery Unit).  PEMANDU, 
formed in September 2009 is also responsible for monitoring the key performance index 
of ministers and ministries and its staff are recruited from outside of the public service.
Hence, under Najib Razak the trend started by his predecessor, Abdullah Badawi in 
increasing reliance on the new technocrats is reinforced.  It is still too early to determine 
the impact of these new actors in economic policies on the relationship between the 
public and private sectors.  It is important to analyze if the new technocrats have improved 
the economic policies and have positively contributed to the modernization and improve-
ment of the bureaucracy.  An example is the Iskandar Regional Development Authority 
(IRDA) staffed mainly by people from outside the public service, which manages the 
Iskandar Malaysia economic region.  IRDA functions as a one-stop center including 
 processing investor applications, which tries to reduce the problems of multiple or over-
lapping jurisdictions, thus saving business time and costs.  In other words, IRDA com-
bines the administrative capacity of the bureaucracy with the corporate efficiency of the 
private sector.
Analysis and Concluding Remarks
Technocrats are a crucial part of Malaysian economic growth and development.  In the 
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earlier periods, they were valued because of their ability, skills, and professionalism to 
advise on policy formulation and to implement measures and programs.  Subsequently, 
the role of technocrats took a lower profile when political leaders had their own visions 
and strategies on how to develop the country.  However, there were still a small number 
of technocrats who had key roles and were highly trusted by the political leaders.  During 
these periods, technocrats pushed for economic efficiency, liberalization, and rural 
develop ment as well as the building of national capacities and industries.
Since the 1997–98 Asian crisis, the role and composition of technocrats have 
changed.  Although there was the pronouncement that the role of technocracy as repre-
sented by the public service/bureaucracy would be restored after being marginalized or 
sidelined during the Mahathir years, this did not actually occur.  It is obvious that tech-
nocracy is playing a more prominent role in the Abdullah Badawi and Najib Razak’s 
Administration but the technocrats are not from the public service.  These new technocrats 
are professionals with corporate or consulting experience, many with Masters in Busi-
ness Administration degrees but not from businesses.  This group has the qualification, 
experience, and skills required to lead the government economic growth initiatives that 
are mostly carried out through the GLCs.  Naturally, public servants do not have such 
skills because their work and experience are mainly in implementing public policies.
The use of GLCs as the vehicles to generate private sector-led growth is under-
standable after the failures of government-promoted Bumiputera entrepreneurs during 
the Asian crisis.  Dr Mahathir and Daim Zainuddin nurtured and promoted a number of 
Bumiputera and non-Bumiputera entrepreneurs through the privatization of government 
companies, infrastructure projects, and the commissioning of services required by the 
government.  This preferential treatment was resented and when many failed, this was 
a good reason to seek a new approach to promote the private sector role in the economy.
If the public sector technocrats wish to re-establish their former influence, they 
must possess the highest level of competency in economic policy-making and implemen-
tation as well as corporate governance.  Moreover, they have to benchmark their ability 
with the best in the business world.  For this, the bureaucracy must be able to attract the 
best graduates.  Recognizing this, Najib Razak has opened the public service to direct 
entry at any level for candidates with talent and exceptional qualifications.  More impor-
tantly, besides having technical competency, the technocrats must uphold the highest 
code of conduct and yet have to be flexible to accommodate political interests.
The issue faced by the political leadership will continue to be on how to balance the 
conservative and sound economic policies recommended by the technocrats with the 
practical demand of the business world, the public and political constituency.  For exam-
ple, although technocrats have advised on reducing the budget deficits by cutting down 
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drastically subsidies, political leaders have to weigh this advice carefully.  The losses 
incurred during the 2008 general election were partly attributed to the decision made by 
Abdullah Badawi to reduce petrol subsidies, which caused the price of petrol to increase 
substantially.  In working with the new technocrats, political leaders will also have to be 
mindful of the resentment that may arise from the public service because this may 
 jeopardize the effective implementation of policies.  There may also be criticism from 
other quarters if the new technocrats do not put national and public interests above 
corporate considerations.
Striking this balance and the efforts to distance technocracy from politics, have their 
roots in the NEP, the role of United Malays National Organization (UMNO) in Malaysian 
politics and national development as well as the legacy of Dr Mahathir.  Until the intro-
duction of the NEP in 1971, UMNO—as the strongest component of the ruling coalition 
party—had not encroached into the technocratic domain so that the boundaries between 
politics and government were observed (and respected).  In other words, technocratic 
integrity was upheld on the basis that political interference and intervention was a breach 
of—at least—the implicit trust between the political and policy-making elites (as two 
distinct groups in the system of government).  That is to say, the technocrats could be 
relied on to formulate and execute policies in consonance with the political agenda of 
national development.  Any purported attempt to directly manipulate and direct the tech-
nocracy as “a government arm of the ruling party” can only disrupt the policy-making 
processes and concomitantly result in demoralization.  This situation, however, was to 
change in the aftermath of the racial riots of 1969.
UMNO, as much as the country, was to be profoundly affected by the socio-economic 
changes brought about by the NEP.  In fact, one could even contend that the transforma-
tion of UMNO went in tandem with the national transformation during the era of the NEP 
(which actually went beyond the stipulated time-frame of 20 years—1971–90).  The ranks 
of UMNO became swelled with members from “non-traditional” backgrounds and pro-
files.  From humble beginnings with the original membership consisting of teachers and 
lower level bureaucrats, the image of UMNO had changed “overnight” by the advent of 
the NEP.  This sociological transformation would in turn impact on the party’s relation-
ship and attitude towards the technocracy.
Dr Mahathir’s intrusive role in relation to the management of the technocracy was 
but a natural reflection of the state-interventionist character of the NEP itself.  The 
“politicized” nature of the NEP—i.e.  as a policy tool to consolidate UMNO’s political 
dominance “required” that the party should be more “audacious” in politicizing the tech-
nocracy.  In short, the UMNO-ization of policy-making could only be a prelude to the 
UMNO-ization of the policy-makers themselves.  Hence, technocrats who were hitherto 
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politically insulated, became more politically conscious.
The sociological transformation of UMNO, with its growing factionalism (linked to 
either Razaleigh/Musa or Mahathir/Daim) led to the split of the party in late 1980s.  This 
had an impact on Malaysian domestic politics and economy in the 1980s and beyond.  The 
involvement of UMNO in business and the corporate world reflected the government’s 
interventionist approach in the economy (i.e. the Malaysian version of state capitalism 
to promote rapid growth and development).  UMNO’s flagship company, Renong, was 
particularly active in representing UMNO’s presence in the capital market—acquisitions 
and investments.  Thus, Renong acted as a proxy or front company for UMNO as a 
political party.  The nexus between politics and business tended to crowd out domestic 
direct investment (DDI) either by encouraging capital flight by local businesses (mainly 
from the Chinese community) or concentrating government procurement in crony com-
panies (as well as “reducing” it to a form of rent-seeking).
Interested parties within UMNO and the ruling government had made it difficult for 
technocrats and senior bureaucrats to work independently.  Daim Zainuddin was appointed 
by Dr Mahathir as Finance Minister twice (1985–91, 1999–2001) and later served as a 
powerful UMNO Treasurer for 17 years.  Subsequently, the involvement of UMNO in 
business definitely had serious repercussions not only on Malaysian development in the 
1980s and beyond but also on the role and contribution of the economic technocrats. 
These technocrats and the public bureaucracy were also expected to fulfil the interests 
of certain UMNO personalities who were either linked or even became part of the ruling 
government.
Dr Mahathir’s own survival in a faction-riven UMNO meant that developmental 
policies of the country must also protect his interests and those of his allies or supporters 
including those outside the party and selective non-Malay businessmen (groups) such 
as  Vincent Tan (Berjaya Group), Ting Pek Khiing (Ekran Group), Yeoh Tiong Lay and 
Francis Yeoh Sock Ping (YTL Group), Eric Chia (Perwaja Steel), and Ananda Krishnan 
(Usaha Tegas Group).
The involvement of UMNO in business, which in turn, led to the growing problem 
of money politics in the party—eventually led to the executive overriding the technocracy 
(primarily via the EPU) for partisan political purposes, which sometimes diverged from 
policy considerations.  In addition, the “traditional” role of technocrats as “advisers” was 
also eclipsed by the emergence of “new” set of actors such as prominent businessmen 
or groups.  However, one could also argue that Dr Mahathir’s big vision or “mega project” 
such as the privatization of public services, the Multimedia Super Corridor, the develop-
ment of Kuala Lumpur City Centre (the “Twin Towers”) and Kuala Lumpur International 
Airport was inspired by his desire to propel Malaysia to a higher level of development. 
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Certainly this vision is beyond the advice or imagination of “traditional” technocrats.
Similarly, the emergence of MITI and the appointment of one of Dr Mahathir’s most 
trusted and capable Cabinet minister, Rafidah Aziz, as the Minister increased the govern-
ment’s expectations of the technocrats.  The changing perception of the technocracy and 
by extension, the bureaucracy was also integral to their modernization and transforma-
tion—from a regulator and administrator to an enabler and pace-setter.  This required 
the technocrats to support the government in forging and fostering a strategic partnership 
to drive growth and promote development in the country.  The 1990s also saw the grow-
ing importance of MATRADE (MITI’s export promotion arm) and MIDA.  Hence, under 
the Mahathir Administration profound changes in policy also saw a shift in the direction 
and outlook of the technocracy and a re-definition of their role in economic decision-
making.
Dr Mahathir “bequeathed” an inimitable legacy upon leaving office in late 2003.  One 
aspect of his legacy has been the impact of the politics-business nexus on the role of the 
technocracy in economic decision-making.  Technocratic role became more reflective of 
Dr Mahathir’s agenda for making Malaysia a developed country, in which the private 
sector will assume a key role.  That in effect reduced and constrained the role of the 
technocracy from being objective and professional policy-makers and administrators to 
agents of a bigger agenda which include political expediency.
This is not to argue that the situation was part of Dr Mahathir’s political strategy of 
consolidating both his personal and UMNO’s dominance or hegemony in the government. 
But rather it was an unintended consequence of Dr Mahathir’s increasing reliance on 
figures outside the government to be his advisers—reflecting the uncanny resemblance 
to his broader reputation as a “maverick” politician and Prime Minister (Wain 2009). 
Furthermore, by having an inner circle of non-technocratic advisers, the technocrats were 
often by-passed or sidelined.  This meant that Dr Mahathir was willing to go beyond the 
conventions or culture of political and administrative conduct if he felt that the technocracy 
did not meet with his expectations or were to prove intransigent to his economic plans.
Technocracy under all Malaysian political leaders is intimately and indispensably 
linked with their respective reform agendas, which promote political legitimacy and 
regime stability.  The background and agenda of the prime ministers, it would seem, are 
important factors in shaping the attitude and relationship between these leaders and the 
technocrats.  However, the profile and composition of technocrats chosen by the political 
leaders will depend on the economic environment and imperatives as well as the skills 
of these technocrats.
Accepted: November 1, 2013
Technocracy in Economic Policy-Making in Malaysia 413
References
Booth, Anne.  1998.  Initial Conditions and Miraculous Growth: Why Is Southeast Asia Different from 
Taiwan and South Korea?  London: School of African and Oriental Studies, University of London.
Chang, Ha-Joon.  1998.  The Role of Institutions in Asian Development.  Asian Development Review 16(2): 
64–95.
Government of Malaysia.  2010.  Public Service Commission Annual Report, 2008–10.  Kuala Lumpur: 
Government Printers Sdn. Bhd.
Haggard, Stephan.  2004.  Institutions and Growth in East Asia.  Studies in Comparative International 
Development 38(4): 53–81.
Jomo, K. S.  1999.  Development Planning in Malaysia: A Critical Appraisal.  In Political Economy of 
Development in Malaysia, edited by B. N. Ghosh and Muhammad Syukri S. Utusan, pp. 85–104.  Kuala 
Lumpur: Utusan Publications & Distributors.
―.  1997.  Southeast Asia’s Misunderstood Miracle: Industrial Policy and Economic Development 
in Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia.  Boulder: West View Press.
Khoo Boo Teik.  2003.  Beyond Mahathir: Malaysian Politics & Its Discontents.  London: Zed Books Ltd.
Malaysian Business Magazine.  1993.  Cited from http://hsudarren.wordpress.com/.  Accessed May 29, 
2014.
Miyakawa, Tadao.  2000.  The Science of Public Policy: Evolution of Policy Sciences, Part 1.  London: 
Routledge.
Neumann, Frederic.  2002.  Curse or Blessing?  Patronage and Economic Policy-Making in Southeast Asia. 
School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) Working Paper Series WP/05/02, John Hopkins 
University, Washington D.C.
Shiraishi, Takashi.  2001.  The Asian Crisis Reconsidered.  RIETI Discussion Paper Series 05-E-014, 
Tokyo.
Sivamurugan Pandian; Rusdi Omar; and Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani.  2010.  “Work with Me, Not for 
Me”: Malaysia under Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (2003–2009).  Asian Culture and History 2(1): 97–107. 
Accessed May 28, 2014, http://journal.ccsenet.org/index.php/ach/article/view/4819.
Torii, Takashi.  2005.  A State with “Seizable” Scale: A Political Economy Approach to Mahathir’s 
Development Policies and Implementation Mechanism.  In After the Crisis: Hegemony, Technocracy 
and Governance in Southeast Asia, edited by Takashi Shiraishi and Patricio N. Abinales, pp. 105–118. 
Kyoto: Kyoto University Press; and Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press.
Wain, Barry.  2009.  Malaysian Maverick: Mahathir Mohamad in Turbulent Times.  London: Palgrave 
Macmillan.
